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SOUPED UP AFFIRMATIVE DISCLOSURE ORDERS
OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
by William F. Lemke, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
Under section 5(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act the
Commission is given authority to conduct hearings, make findings
and issue cease and desist orders requiring any person, partner-
ship or corporation to cease and desist from use of unfair methods
of competition or unfair or deceptive practices in commerce.' The
Commission also issues consent orders in cases which are con-
cluded by agreement between the Commission and the allegedly
offending party. 2 Consent orders have the same force and binding
effect as those issued after hearings and findings. 3
Although it is well established that the Commission has very
broad discretion and authority in framing the scope of its orders,
there are limits on its power. 4 It is the thesis of this paper that the
Federal Trade Commission has exceeded its broad authority to
fashion cease and desist orders in its recent proposal to include in
some cease and desist orders a requirement that the respondents
against whom the orders are issued must disclose in their sub-
sequent advertising that a cease and desist order is standing
against them because of claims they made in prior advertising.
One of these is Standard Oil Company of California, 5 where
the Federal Trade Commission has issued a complaint challenging
certain advertising claims made by Standard for its Chevron
brand gasoline. The gasoline has an additive known as F-310,
which is claimed by Standard to have significant effect in reducing
the amount of unburned hydrocarbons and carbon monoxide
emissions in automotive exhaust fumes, thereby contributing to
the reduction of air pollution. The Commission has challenged the
F-310 claims as unfounded and deceptive. It has proposed a
cease and desist order which, in addition to requiring Standard to
* Professor of Law, Loyola University of Chicago. J.D., 1935, George Washington.
15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1964).
2 F.T.C. Procedures and Rules of Practice, 16 C.F.R. § 2.31-34 (1970).
3 Id. § 2.33.
4 E.g., orders must have a reasonable relationship to the unfair practices found to exist,
F.T.C. v. National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419 (1957).
5 Standard Oil Company of California, 3 TRADE REG. REP. 19,352 (FTC 1970).
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cease and desist from use of the allegedly misleading F-310
claims, would require it to disclose in all gasoline advertisements,
for the period of one year, that former advertising for its gasoline
had contained false, misleading and deceptive statements, repre-
sentations and demonstrations. The Commission would require
that not less than twenty-five percent of the space or exposure
time devoted to each subsequent advertisement be used for the
purpose of making the affirmative discolsure. 6 The other case
involves the Coca-Cola Company's advertising for Hi-C fruit
drinks, 7 where similar affirmative disclosure requirements are pro-
posed by the Commission. The proposed cease and desist order
would bar Coca-Cola from making nutrient claims for any of its
products unless it disclosed that the Hi-C advertising had been
questioned by the Commission.
II. NATURE AND HISTORY OF CEASE AND DESIST ORDERS
A review of the nature and history of Federal Trade Commis-
sion cease and desist orders will help delineate the difficulties with
the two proposed orders. Federal Trade Commission orders are
basically injunctive in effect and prohibitory in nature. They are
intended to be regulatory and not punitive.8 Thus no penal provi-
sions or punitive sanctions are imposed because of the unfair or
deceptive practice which gave rise to the cease and desist order.
Civil penalty provisions which permit recovery, on suit by the
United States Attorney, of penalties of up to $5000 for each
violation of a cease and desist order come into play only if an
order which has become final is itself violated.9 The civil penalties
are imposed only for violation of the order, and the proceedings
leading to imposition of such penalties are separate and distinct
from those which resulted in issuance of the original cease and
desist order. 10
The Federal Trade Commission Act provides only for the
issuance of cease and desist orders for the purpose of preventing
continued violations of the Act.11 Therefore, the orders look to
6 In re Standard Oil Co. of California, No. 8827 (FTC, Dec. 29, 1970).
7 Coca-Cola Company, 3 TRADE REG. REP. 19,351 (FTC 1970). The order in Stan-
dard appears somewhat broader than the order in Coca-Cola. The latter would apply the
affirmative disclosure requirement only to subsequent advertising which made claims to
nutrient ingredients. The Standard order would require affirmative disclosure in all sub-
sequent advertising of gasoline.
8 United Corporation v. F.T.C., 110 F.2d 473 (4th Cir. 1940).
9 15 U.S.C. 45(l) (1964).
10 Drath v. F.T.C., 239 F.2d 452 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 917 (1957).
11 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1964).
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the future and are not applied retroactively.12 Generally they do
not require the respondent to undertake affirmative action.13 Since
the Federal Trade Commission Act is not one of those statutes
designated as "antitrust laws" by section 1 of the Clayton Act,14
there is no statutory basis for private suit for damages against
violators of the Federal Trade Commission Act, and the courts
have consistently refused to permit private suits to be brought for
the purpose of remedying individual rights which may have been
impaired because of practices which violate the Federal Trade
Commission Act. 15
In the Ruberoid case 16 the Supreme Court enunciated broad
guidelines for the scope of Federal Trade Commission orders: (1)
orders are not intended to impose criminal punishment or exact
compensatory damages; (2) orders are intended to prevent illegal
practices in the future; (3) orders need not be limited to the
precise form of an established illegal practice; (4) orders may be
framed so as to be broad enough to prevent easy circumvention
by the party against whom they are issued; (5) the Commission
has broad discretion in its choice of remedy; and (6) the remedy
selected must have some reasonable relation to the unlawful prac-
tices found to exist. The Ruberoid order imposed negative in-
hibitions and the Court, consequently, did not have the occasion
to apply its guidelines to an order which required affirmative
disclosures on the part of the respondent.
A. Affirmative Disclosure Cases
Such an affirmative order was, however, involved in Alberty v.
12 Niresk Industries, Inc. v. F.T.C., 278 F.2d 337 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 883
(1960). "Commission orders are not designed to punish for past transgressions, but are
designed as a means for preventing 'illegal practices in the future.' " Id. at 343, quoting
F.T.C. v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 473 (1952).
13 See Curtis Publishing Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 19,376 (FTC 1970). In a proceeding
against the publishing company the complaint charged the Federal Trade Commission Act
was violated because cash refunds were not offered to subscribers of the defunct magazine,
Saturday Evening Post. The hearing examiner ruled that a proposed order requiring
payment of refunds was beyond the scope of the Commission's order making power.
14 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1964). Section I of the Clayton Act defines "antitrust laws" to
include the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964); the
Wilson Tariff Act's antitrust amendments, 28 Stat. 570 (1894), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 8- 11 (1964); the amendments to the Wilson Tariff Act's antitrust amendments, 37 Stat.
667 (1913), 15 U.S.C. §§ 8- 11 (1964); and the Clayton Act itself. Section 4 of the Act, 15
U.S.C. § 15 (1964), permits suits for treble damages by any person who may be injured in
his business or property by reason of an antitrust law violation
15 Carlson v. Coca-Cola Co., 318 F.Supp. 185 (N.D. Cal. 1970). But see Kardon v.
National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, (E.D. Pa.), modified, 83 F. Supp. 613 (1947),
allowing stockholder suits to recover damages resulting from violation of the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934. See also Ruder, Challenging Corporate Action Under Rule
lOb-5, 25 Bus. LAWYER75 (1969).
16 F.T.C. v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470 (1952).
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Federal Trade Commission.1 7 In Alberty the respondent was a
seller of various proprietary drug products including a blood tonic
called Oxorin which Alberty claimed to be effective in relieving
that "weary, tired, run-down" feeling. The Commission found the
advertising for this product to be false and misleading. It issued an
order requiring Alberty to cease and desist from representing that
Oxorin "will have any therapeutic effect upon the blood or red
corpuscles thereof, except in the case of simple iron deficiency
anemia... "18
In addition to the above negative prohibition the order required
subsequent advertising for Oxorin to include an affirmative dis-
closure "that the condition of lassitude is caused less frequently
by simple iron deficiency anemia than by other causes and that in
such cases this preparation will not be effective in relieving or
correcting it." In effect, the respondent was required to disclose
that his product would not be effective, in most cases, to relieve
the symptoms for which it was advertised.
On review by the court of appeals the issue was whether the
Federal Trade Commission had authority to issue an order requir-
ing affirmative disclosures by a respondent. The court modified
the Commission's order by deleting the affirmative disclosure
requirement.19 The position of the two judges who agreed on the
majority opinion was that the Commission's orders were intended
by Congress to be primarily negative in function. The Commis-
sion had power to require that a product be truthfully represented
but not power to require affirmative disclosures unless they were
needed to provide instructions or explanations or to warn against
dangers incident to use of the product.
The dissenting judge pointed out that the Federal Trade Com-
mission was created by Congress to become a body of experts in
a complex society. In his view,
the action taken by the majority overlooks the fact that Con-
gress, by enacting legislation proscribing false and deceptive
advertising, sought to remedy the consumer's patent inability
to ascertain the merit of claims made by advertisers. The
Act's purpose is to encourage the informative function of
1744 F.T.C. 475 (1948), 182 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 818
(1950).
18 182 F.2d at 37.
19 182 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 818 (1950). Affirmative dis-
closures required to comply with statutory provisions of various labeling and information
statutes which are administered by the Commission are not within the scope of this paper.
See Wool Products Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. § 68 (1964); Fur Products Labeling Act, 15
U.S.C. § 69 (1964); Textile Fiber Products Identification Act, 15 U.S.C. § 70 (1964).
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advertising; and the Commission's duty is to eliminate false-
hoods. 20
The apparent setback for affirmative disclosure orders which
the Commission suffered in Alberty was soon overcome. Later
cases did not interpret Alberty as a challenge to the Commission's
authority to issue cease and desist orders.21 These decisions in-
terpreted Alberty to mean merely that the Commission had not
properly exercised its authority in that case by reason of its failure
to find that the public would not be adequately protected from the
respondent's deceptive advertising unless certain affirmative dis-
closures were made.
In Keele Hair & Scalp Specialists, Inc. v. Federal Trade
Commission,22 where the respondent advertised a hair growing
remedy, it was represented that baldness was unnecessary, that
hopeless cases of baldness were rare, and that ninety-five percent
of all baldness cases could be treated by the Keele method. The
Commission made findings, based on substantial evidence, that
approximately ninety-five percent of baldness in the case of men
(to whom the Keele advertising was primarily directed) resulted
from male pattern baldness for which there was, unfortunately, no
known remedy. The Keele court stated:
There is nothing in the Alberty case that prevents enforce-
ment of a cease and desist order requiring affirmative dis-
closure. The Alberty case simply held that the Commission
must make certain findings before compelling affirmative dis-
closure. In the instant case the Commission made the re-
quired findings and on the basis of these findings issued its
order requiring that petitioners disclose affirmatively that
Keele preparation would not be effective against male pattern
baldness. Failure to disclose that approximately 95 percent of
the cases of baldness fall within the male pattern type is
plainly misleading, when the petitioners claim they treat
effectively virtually all cases of baldness. 23
In the J.B. Williams case, 24 the advertised product was Geritol,
a blood tonic represented to be of benefit in the treatment of some
of the same symptoms described in Alberty, i.e., "tired run down
feeling," iron poor blood" and the like. Here the court affirmed
the Federal Trade Commission's affirmative disclosure order,
20 182 F.2d at 45.
21 Keele Hair & Scalp Specialists, Inc. v. F.T.C., 275 F.2d 18 (5th Cir. 1960); Ward
Laboratories, Inc. v. F.T.C., 276 F.2d 952 (2d Cir. 1960); J.B. Williams Co. v. F.T.C.,
381 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1967).
22 275 F.2d 18 (5th Cir. 1960).
23 Id. at 23.2 4 J.B. Williams Co. v. F.T.C., 381 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1967).
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again supported by adequate findings that the great majority of
persons suffering from the described symptoms would not be
benefited by taking Geritol. Moreover, this finding was considered
by the court to be a "material fact" within the meaning of section
15 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.2 5 Therefore, the re-
quirement in the order of an affirmative disclosure that the great
majority of persons who suffer from tiredness, run down feelings,
etc. would not be helped by taking Geritol was held to be appro-
priate.
B. Characteristic Types of Affirmative Disclosures
Since Alberty, affirmative disclosure requirements within the
guidelines set out by the courts have been used in many situ-
ations. Several orders have been issued in foreign origin cases
involving products made wholly or substantially in a foreign coun-
try.26 The Commission has required disclosure of the source
either by marking the product, its package or container, or by
other appropriate means. The disclosure has been required in
those cases where the Commission has found that a substantial
number of the persons who might purchase the foreign product
have a preference for products of domestic origin. Such prefer-
ence might influence their choice of purchase and it would be
misleading if they were not informed of the foreign origin before
making a selection. Therefore, it was felt that an affirmative dis-
closure of the foreign origin was needed to prevent deception.
Another line of cases has involved used, rebuilt or reprocessed
products which are offered in such a manner that the purchaser
may assume they are new.27 In the used oil cases where crank
case drainings and other used oil was "re-refined" and sold to
motorists, it was held that an affirmative disclosure that the prod-
uct was derived from used oil could be required on the containers
in which the oil was offered to the consumer. Even though there
was evidence that the "re-refined" oil was equivalent in quality to
virgin crude oil, a finding by the Commission that a substantial
number of the purchasing public preferred to purchase new oil
and would believe respondent's oil was made from virgin crude
unless otherwise informed,established the likelihood of deception.
'z 15 U.S.C. § 55(a)(1) (1964).
26E.g., L. Heller & Son, Inc. v. F.T.C., 191 F.2d 954 (7th Cir. 1951); American Tack
Co. v. F.T.C., 211 F.2d 239 (2d Cir. 1954).
27 Kerran v. F.T.C., 265 F.2d 246 (10th Cir. 1959); Mohawk Refining Corp. v. F.T.C.,
263 F.2d 818 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 814 (1959); Royal Oil Corp. v. F.T.C., 262
F.2d 741 (4th Cir. 1959).
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The purchaser was entitled to know the facts regarding the source
of respondent's oil and entitled to base his choice thereon.28
Affirmative 'disclosure that the product has been rebuilt or
reconstituted from previously used components has also been
required where television picture tubes have been rebuilt with
new electronic parts but reused glass envelopes obtained from old
picture tubes; 29 where automotive replacement parts have been
rebuilt from formerly used parts;30 and where used goose feathers
have been incorporated into feather and down products which are
sold as new.31
Another line of affirmative disclosure cases has involved syn-
thetic materials which simulate or closely resemble precious met-
als. Here the purchaser is entitled to know what he is really
buying. If a plastic material closely resembles leather, and leather
historically has been the commonly accepted component of cer-
tain consumer items, the Commission has appropriately required
that affirmative disclosure be made of the non-leather parts. 32
Analogously, where a base metal resembles a precious metal,
affirmative disclosure that the product is in fact composed wholly
or partially of base metal has been required. 33
Still another line of cases has involved products which may
have latent danger potential for the individual user,34 for the
mechanisms with which they are used, 35 or for the environment. 36
In such cases the Commission is well within the court established
guidelines when it requires the seller to make an affirmative
disclosure of the product's dangerous potentialities along with his
advertisement of the benefits which it may provide. Such a dis-
closure is needed to protect the user if he would expect the
product to be safe under normal use conditions. The disclosure
also provides him with information which might be influential in
causing him to purchase or not to purchase a product.
Another practice, which is frequently employed in credit sales
28 Cases cited note 27 supra.
2 Liberty Electronics, Inc., 58 F.T.C. 491 (1961); Mercury Tube Corp., 58 F.T.C. 464
(1961); American Standard Television Tube Corp., 58 F.T.C. 224 (1961).30 Lee Electric Co., 60 F.T.C. 491 (1962); Sidney Lenet Doing Business As M. & M.
Spring Co., 50 F.T.C. 207 (1953).
31 Purofied Down Products Corp., 48 F.T.C. 155 (1951).32Trade Practice Rules, Luggage and Related Products Industry, 16 C.F.R. § 154
(1962).
33 Guides for the Watch Industry, 16 C.F.R. Pt. 245 (1968).
34 Aronberg v. Federal Trade Commission, 132 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1942); Trade Regu-
lation Rule for the Prevention of Unfair or Deceptive Advertising & Labeling of Ciga-
rettes in Relation to the Health Hazards of Smoking, 16 C.F.R. § 408 (1964).
SE.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 19,395 (FTC 1970).
36 Labeling and Advertising Requirements for Detergents (proposed Trade Regulation
Rule) 1971 BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REGULATION REPORT No. 497, at G-1.
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of home improvements to consumers, is assignment of the con-
sumer's note or other instrument of indebtedness to a third party
so as to cut off defenses on the contract which might be available
against the original seller. Such practices have been the subject of
affirmative disclosure requirements. 37 The disclosure order was
supported by findings that a substantial number of purchasers
believed the original seller would not transfer their instruments of
indebtedness to third parties. Had they known of the intended
transfer, they might not have agreed to purchase the home im-
provements on credit.
Prior to enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1968,38 the
Federal Trade Commission entered new frontiers when it issued
complaints against several operators of rental apartments located
in the State of Virginia. The complaints alleged that advertising
for the apartments was misleading because it represented that
they were available to the general public whereas, in fact, they
were not available to black applicants.39 The proposed cease and
desist order would have required the respondents to cease placing
any advertisements which tended to convey the false impression
that apartments would be rented to the general public without
restriction because of race, color or national origin. 40 Presumably,
advertising would be in compliance only if there were either a
removal of the restrictions or an affirmative disclosure that they
existed.
The Commission rejected a hearing examiner's dismissal of the
complaints on grounds they were rendered moot by subsequent
enactment of the fair housing provisions of the Civil Rights Act of
1968,41 but itself dismissed the complaints on the different ground
that unqualified assurances of discontinuance of the challenged
practices had been given by each of the respondents.42 By its
dismissal the Commission avoided testing its jurisdiction and the
scope of affirmative disclosure orders in the cases in question.
In all of the cases considered thus far, the Commission has
made findings or could have made findings which would bring its
affirmative disclosure orders within the scope of the broad guide-
lines for cease and desist orders laid down by the Supreme Court
37 All-State Industries of North Carolina, Inc. [1967- 1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE
REG. REP. 18,740 (FTC 1969), affd, All-State Industries of N.C., Inc. v. F.T.C. 423
F.2d 423 (4th Cir. 1970); see also Negotiable Instruments-F.T.C. Policy, 5 TRADE REG.
REP. IL50,257 (FTC 1969).
3842 U.S.C. § 3601 (Supp. V, 1968).
31 First Buckingham Community, Inc. [1967- 1970 Transfer Binder ] TRADE REG. REP.
18,122 (FTC 1967).40 Id.
4142 U.S.C. § 3601, as amended, (Supp. V, 1965- 1969).
4 [1967- 1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 18,357, 18,662 (FTC 1968).
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in Ruberoid.43 The scope of the orders has been to prevent
statements in advertising from being deceptive and misleading or
to warn against possible consequences which might result from
use of the product. The orders have been prospective in nature
and non-punitive in effect.
III. THE SOUP ORDERS
In the context of these prior uses of affirmative disclosure, the
proposed affirmative disclosure orders in the Standard Oil and
Coca-Cola cases are more clearly brought into focus. In these
cases the Commission is attempting to use affirmative disclosure
in a sharply divergent manner from that in the past. The orders
proposed in Standard and Coca-Cola are sometimes referred to
as "SOUP" type orders. The name is one adopted by a group of
law students who organized themselves under the name Students
Opposed to Unfair Practices (SOUP),44 and challenged the man-
ner in which the Federal Trade Commission was handling pro-
ceedings against certain advertising of the Campbell Soup Com-
pany.
In the Campbell case,4 a proposed consent order prohibited
the respondent from using advertising which falsely represented
its soup or other food products. One of the advertising representa-
tions to which the Commission objected was a television com-
mercial which pictured a bowl of soup into which Campbell had
inserted a handful of marbles for the purpose of forcing the solid
ingredients to the top and making them more visible to the tele-
vision viewer. The Campbell Company consented to issuance of
the order and the Commission provisionally accepted it.46 In
accordance with the Federal Trade Commission procedures, the
proposed order was placed on the public record for thirty days to
permit comment by interested parties.47
43 F.T.C. v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470 (1952). See text accompanying note 16 supra.
44 Wall St. Jour., Feb. 5, 1970, at I, col. 4. The name may derive from the case in which
the students chose to involve themselves or may be a throwback to the "Alphabet Soup"
days of the Franklin Roosevelt presidency. In that era the proliferation of new govern-
mental agencies referred to by initials coined the Alphabetical Soup title. Compare "Oper-
ation Truth," the program suggested by former Commissioner Philip Elman, 1970 BNA
ANTITRUST & TRADE REGULATION REPORT No. 488 at A-I. This program is designed to
relieve manpower shortages at the F.T.C. by enlisting law students to monitor advertising
media. Potentially unfair advertising could be reported to the Commission or class actions
could be initiated.
45 Campbell Soup Company, [1967- 1970 Transfer Binder] 3 TRADE REG. REP. 19,261
(FTC 1970). See also F.T.C. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374 (1965).
46 Campbell Soup Company, [1967- 1970 Transfer Binder] 3 TRADE REG. REP.
19,261 (FTC 1970).
47 F.T.C. Procedures and Rules of Practice, 16 C.F.R. § 2.34(b) (1970).
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Within the period allowed for comment, the SOUP law student
group filed a motion to intervene. Although SOUP did not in-
dicate any disagreement with the prohibitory terms of the cease
and desist order, they contended that an affirmative disclosure
provision should have been added which would require the re-
spondent to disclose in its subsequent advertising that a prior
advertisement had been challenged by the Commission as decep-
tive.
The motion to intervene was denied. 48 The Commission denial
rested on several grounds: (1) the order was substantially similar
to the one upheld by the Supreme Court in the leading television
mock up case, Federal Trade Commission v. Colgate Palmolive
Co.;4 9 (2) any violations of the order would be subject to civil
penalty sanctions; 50 (3) the principal objective of the Commis-
sion's orders should be to stop the deception itself; and (4) accep-
tance of the proposed order as it stood would be in the public
interest. In addition, the Commission felt it could not afford to
devote more of its resources to protracted consideration of the
Campbell case. The deceptive advertising had been discontinued
and the agency's resources could be better used elsewhere. This
need to make the most effective use of its available resources was
said by the Commission to be the principal reason for denying the
petition to intervene.
Nevertheless, the Federal Trade Commission did not explicitly
reject SOUP's affirmative disclosure idea. In fact, it was not long
before the Commission decided, of its own violition, to utilize the
SOUP type order in the Standard Oil and Coca-Cola cases. As
previously indicated, the nature of these orders is to require both
companies to acknowledge in future advertising that their prior
statements were false, misleading and deceptive. It now seems
clear that at least the Standard case is likely to be tested in the
courts. The Commission has already issued its complaint and
Standard Oil Company of California has advertised extensively
that it has full confidence in its additive and plans to continue to
advertise and market it.51
IV. THE STANDARD ORDER
Standard can certainly allege that the affirmative disclosure
4 8 Campbell Soup Company. [ 1967- 1970 Transfer Binder] 3 TRADE REG. REP. 19,261
(FTC 1970).
49 F.T.C. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374 (1965).
50 15 U.S.C. § 45(l) (1964).
5' Wall St. Jour., Oct. 7, 1970, at 20 & 21 (double page advertisement).
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requirement of the proposed cease and desist order is without
precedent. Unlike former orders, the proposed affirmative dis-
closure is not designed to prevent misleading the public in regard
to a present advertising claim. Standard would not merely be
required to make appropriate explanatory disclosures which
would eliminate deception in a concurrent advertising claim.
Rather, the proposed order would both prohibit Standard from
claiming that F-310 is a valuable anti-pollutant, and require the
company to publicly acknowledge that prior commercials stating
F- 310 would reduce the amount of unburned hydrocarbons were
false, misleading and deceptive, and now subject to a Federal
Trade Commission cease and desist order.
Since the proposed order is different, requiring publication of
prior wrongs and purely prospective in effect, it may run afoul of
the tests established by the courts for determining the propriety of
an affirmative disclosure order. One of the tests is that the Com-
mission must find that the affirmative disclosure is necessary to
free the Standard advertising from deception. 52 If the subsequent
advertising does not make any deceptive claims, the Commission
would presumably be unable to make such findings. At the time
the proposed order is issued the Commission obviously has no
means of knowing what claims will be made in future advertising.
There is no apparent reason to believe that the purported
misrepresentation of the qualities of F- 3 10 is more grievous than
that employed in other affirmative disclosure cases, especially
since affirmative disclosure requirements are usually reserved
only for circumstances where the respondent has been guilty of
flagrant abuses. 53 Since the prior cases of flagrant abuse have not
required orders which force disclosure of the past mis-
representations in all subsequent advertising, it would seem ap-
propriate for the court to at least require that the Commission
establish why the more onerous order is necessary in this case.
Moreover, the insistence of the Commission on the necessity of
the affirmative disclosure may be offset by the fact that the sub-
52 F.T.C. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374 (1965).
53 See United Association of Credit Bureaus, Inc. v. F.T.C., 299 F.2d 220 (7th Cir.
1962). The court, holding an affirmative order involving disclosure of the purpose of a debt
collection form to be arbitrary, stated that "[aln affirmative disclosure order usually is
reserved for circumstances when the respondent has been guilty of flagrant abuses." Id. at
223. Unless the challenged advertising itself constitutes "flagrant abuse" neither
Coca-Cola Co. nor Standard Oil Co. of California have the record of frequent violators.
One former proceeding against Standard involving violation of section 5 of the F.T.C. Act
and section 2 of the Clayton Act resulted in a cease and desist order, Atlas Supply Co., 48
F.T.C. 53 (1951). A complaint against Coca-Cola was dismissed, 2 F.T.C. 461 (1919).
Currently pending are proposed complaints against Coca-Cola involving games of chance,
Coca-Cola Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 19,290 (FTC 1970) and exclusive territories, Crush
International Ltd., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 19,443 (FTC 1971).
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sequent advertising will be forbidden to assert the anti-pollutant
value of F-310, and also because the dispute over Standard's
advertising is already getting significant public exposure through
news coverage of the complaint. In any event, should the Federal
Trade Commission be able to establish a need for the proposed
affirmative disclosure, the terms of the order, to be consistent with
the historical context, should be drafted so as not to penalize but
merely to correct the misconception. In this context, it seems
especially unclear why the specific provision of twenty-five per-
cent of all advertising space for one year is necessary to free
Standard from its prior deception. Surely where the case involves
new legal approaches and requirements, a court should not accept
the Commission's determination of the degree of necessity simply
because it is the conclusion of an administrative agency.
A second test applied by the courts in reviewing proposed
orders is whether the scope of the order is reasonably related to
the offense. 54 In Standard the affirmative disclosure would appear
in subsequent, separate advertising copy which might make claims
having no relationship to those made in the condemned advertis-
ing. The disclosure might very well do nothing whatsoever to
clarify or explain consequences of either the original or the sub-
sequent advertising.
The guidelines laid down by the courts provide that the order
cannot be punitive. The Federal Trade Commission is vested with
regulatory powers to issue orders designed to prevent deceptive
practices from recurring in the future and not, like the Standard
order, to punish for past transgressions. 5 The Commission itself
has recognized and fostered its mission to provide non-punitive
guidance and advice to industry and the public by adopting and
administering its Industry Guidance program. 56 The SOUP type
orders appear vulnerable to a charge that they are punitive rather
than regulatory in nature. In the past, public announcement of
complaints and orders has provided the public with information
regarding practices which have been challenged or prohibited. 57
54 F.T.C. v. National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419 (1957).
55 Niresk Industries, Inc. v. F.T.C., 278 F.2d 337 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 993
(1960); Erickson v. F.T.C., 272 F.2d 318 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 940
(1960).
56 F.T.C. Procedures and Rules of Practice, 16 C.F.R. 1. 1, Subpt. A. (1970):
Any person, partnership, or corporation may request advice from the
Commission with respect to a course of action which the requesting party
proposes to pursue. It is the Commission's policy to consider requests for
such advice and, where practicable, to inform the requesting party of the
Commission's views.57 See F.T.C. v. Cinderella Career & Finishing Schools, Inc., 404 F.2d 1308 (D.C. Cir.
1968), where F.T.C. authority to issue press releases is considered.
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Here, Standard is told to use its purchased advertising space to
apprise the public of past misrepresentations. Not only do SOUP
orders in and of themselves appear to be punitive, but the require-
ment that twenty-five percent of all advertising space for one year
be devoted to acknowledging the misrepresentation, regardless of
whether F-310 is mentioned in the advertising, is so excessive
that punishment rather than information appears to be the intent
of the Commission. If the Commission actually believes the dis-
closure is needed to prevent deception, the disclosure should be
required for the life of the cease and desist order, not merely for
one year.
Aside from the tests set forth in the guidelines, a factor of
major importance is whether the affirmative disclosure require-
ment will deter future violations or prevent easy circumvention of
the Commission's orders. 58 If punitive sanctions are, in fact, per-
missible in Federal Trade Commission orders, there may be
enough stigma attached to the affirmative disclosure requirement
to cause the advertiser to be more careful in making future prod-
,uct claims. Yet, where the orders evoke greater care by tending to
punishment, they depart from the role intended for the Federal
Trade Commission, which is to halt misinformation and not to
impose punitive sanctions on offenders. Where an advertiser sin-
cerely believes that his advertising claims are true and has docu-
mented them with experiments and tests as Standard claims to
have done,59 punishment seems to be a particularly inappropriate
remedy. The threat of an onerous cease and desist order should
not be allowed to cause an advertiser to suppress public an-
nouncement of new technological advances which he honestly
believes he has achieved.
Finally, there are several potential adverse results which might
derive from acceptance of the proposed order. In the first place
one cannot be assured that the availability of additional copy or
exposure space will mean that advertising will be more in-
formative. On the other hand it does appear likely that reduction
in the amount of available copy or exposure space will reduce the
extent to which advertising might be informative. It may be ques-
tioned whether the requirement, that twenty-five percent of Stan-
dards future advertising space be devoted to reminding the reader
or viewer of an already issued cease and desist order, will add to
the informative potentialities of future advertising. Second, and
perhaps more important, the likely impact of such oppressive
58 F.T.C. v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470 (1952). See text accompanying note 17 supra.
59 See note 5 1 supra.
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orders will be a drastic reduction in the amount of advertising by
the offender during the period covered by the order. This would
seem to be particularly true in the case of major producers of well
known products. They may feel it is preferable to rely on their
established reputation and to diminish or discontinue advertising
during the period for which the affirmative disclosure is required.
Discouraging any information at all is incompatible with the Fed-
eral Trade Commission's purpose of ensuring the accuracy of
information.
The Federal Trade Commission has been sharply criticized by
appointed 60 and self-appointed 61 critics who have questioned its
effectiveness and even its right to continue to exist. The Commis-
sion's proposed use of more onerous affirmative disclosure orders
may be an over-reaction to such criticism. By taking drastic and
unprecedented action in ordinary false and misleading advertising
cases, the Commission may appease some of its critics. In so
doing, however, it may be departing from its duty to use its
available resources in the most efficient and expeditious manner
for the purpose of protecting the public from deception.
60 ABA, REPORT OF THE ABA COMMISSION TO STUDY THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMIS-
SION (1969).
61 "Nader's Raiders" report: The Consumer and the Federal Trade Commission-A
Critique of the Consumer Protection Record of the FCC, reprinted in 115 CONG. REC.
1539 (1969).
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